Abstract-Cloud storage can provide a flexible on-demand data storage service to users anywhere and anytime. However, users' data is owned by cloud service providers physically, and the physical boundary between two users' data is fuzzy. In this environment not controlled by users, a method to ensure users' data integrity must be provided. In order to avoid retrieving enormous storage data and users themselves checking, a public auditing protocol was proposed based on the BLS short signature scheme and the homomorphic hash function. The user computed the signatures of the blocks, and moved them to cloud servers to store. Cloud service providers computed the aggregation of the blocks, and the aggregation of signatures. Third party auditor verified whether the aggregate data was consistent with the aggregate signature. If consistent, users' data integrity was verified. Based on the computational DiffieHellman assumption, the presented protocol is secure against the lost attack and tamper attack from cloud service providers. Based on the stream encryption, the proposed protocol is secure against the curious attack from third party auditor. As the independence among blocks and block signatures, this protocol supports blocks' update, including insertion, modification and deletion. So, the protocol is secure and efficient, and supports for public verification, dynamic update and privacy preserving.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the basic service of cloud computing [1] , cloud storage service, such as Microsoft's Azure Storage Service [2] and Amazon Simple Storage Service [3] , has been provided to users. Connecting a large number of different types of storage devices to work together through application software, cloud storage provides data storage and business access services to users. By storing their data to the cloud in an on-demand manner, users can use the public infrastructure, so that investment of building and maintaining storage equipments is avoided.
Users can rely on the cloud to provide more reliable services, so that they can access data from anywhere and at any time. Cloud storage service has been envisioned as the next generation of storage services.
At the same time, cloud storage service also brings new and challenging security issues [4, 5] . Storing the data on personal devices, users have the highest privilege to operate on it and ensure its security. However, once users move their data to the cloud, the data is controlled by cloud service providers (CSP). The cases cited in [6] illustrate that cloud storage service also suffers from internal or external data security threats in spite of the claimed completeness given by CSP. Even for the sake of keeping reputation, CSP may deliberately conceal security accidents. So, users must take the security issues in cloud storage service into account. Even under the internal or external security attacks, users should prevent their data accessed by unauthorized party, and detect their data lost or tampered by adversaries. Specially, there are more worries about rarely accessed data.
As Internet security service, if the data integrity is verified, the data lost or tampered can be checked by the users. However, cloud storage service has some special characters [7] . Firstly, as the amount of data stored in cloud is enormous, it is impossible to verify the data integrity after retrieving the data duo to the expensive I/O and transmission cost. Secondly, cloud storage service uses the distributed storage systems, so the data is stored in a set of cloud servers. Data integrity verification measures for Internet are unfit for cloud storage system. There are two kinds of ways to verify data integrity in cloud storage system [8] : owner auditing [9] [10] [11] and public auditing [12] [13] [14] [15] . With owner auditing, only users check the integrity of their remote stored data, which could introduce heavy overhead and cost. Avoiding any side of CSP or the data owner conducting the auditing, public auditing, transferring the auditing procedure to third party auditor (TPA), is a natural choice.
Wang et al. [12, 13] firstly study the public auditing measures in cloud storage. In [12] , they consider the task of allowing TPA, on behalf of the users, to verify the integrity of the dynamic data stored in the cloud servers. The support for data dynamics via the most general forms of data operation, such as block modification, insertion and deletion, is achieved. Remote data integrity is ensured with the support for both public verifiability and dynamic data operations, but users' data privacy is not preserved. In [13] , they also consider introducing TPA to audit the cloud data storage. They utilize public-key based homomorphic authenticator and uniquely integrate it with random mask technique to achieve a privacy preserving public auditing system. However, the signature scheme used in [13] is insecure. In order to facilitate rapid deployment of cloud data storage service and regain security assurances with outsourced data dependability, Cong Wang et al. [14] emphasize efficient methods that enable on-demand data correctness verification on behalf of cloud data owners have to be designed. They describe approaches and system requirements that should be brought into consideration, and outline challenges that need to be resolved for such a publicly auditable secure cloud storage service to become a reality. Zhu et al. [15] propose a formal framework for interactive provable data possession (IPDP) and a zeroknowledge IPDP solution for private clouds. Their ZK-IPDP protocol achieves probabilistic data possession guarantee, supports fully data dynamics, public verifiability and is also private against the verifiers. Furthermore, they propose an efficient construction of cooperative provable data possession, which can be used in hybrid clouds. Hao et al. [16] propose a new remote data integrity checking protocol for cloud storage. The proposed protocol is suitable for providing integrity protection of the users' important data. The proposed protocol supports data insertion, modification and deletion at the block level, and also supports public verifiability. The proposed protocol is proved to be secure against an untrusted server. It is also private against third party verifiers. The above discussed protocols are compared, and the results are summarized in Table I . [12] The protocol in [13] The protocol in [15] The protocol in [ This paper aims at solving the security problem of the protocol in [13] , and presenting a secure and efficient public auditing protocol based on the homomorphism technology, which supports for public verifiability, data dynamics and privacy preserving. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, technical preliminaries which are needed in this research are presented. The system model, attack model and verification model of public auditing are introduced in section III. In section IV, a new and secure public auditing protocol is proposed based on the security flaw in [13] . We describe the support for data dynamics of the proposed protocol in section V. In section VI, a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented. In section VII, the protocol's complexity is analyzed in the aspects of communication, computation and storage costs, and experiments on the personal computer show that the protocol is feasible. Conclusions and possible future work are presented in section VIII. • Non-degeneracy. There are
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Maps
There is an efficient algorithm to
B. BLS Short Signature Scheme
The BLS signature scheme [17] comprises three algorithms, KeyGen , Sign , and Verify . It makes use of a full domain hash function
H is viewed as a random oracle.
• KeyGen . Pick random * p x ←  , and compute x v g ← . The secret key is x . The public key is v .
• Sign . Given a secret key x , and a message
σ is the signature of message m .
• Verify . Given a public key v , a message m , and a signature σ , verify ( , ) ( ( ), )
C. Homomorphic Hash Funtion
A homomorphic hash function H [18, 19] • Homomorphism. 
• Collision Resistance. There is no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary capable of forging 
and .
(3) III THE PUBLIC AUDITING MODEL
A. System Model A representative system model for the public auditing is illustrated in Figure 1 . There are three different entities in the system model of public auditing:
User: an entity, which has large data files to be stored in the cloud and relies on the cloud for data maintenance and computation, can be either individual consumers or organizations.
Cloud service providers (CSP): an entity, which is the manager of cloud servers, has significant storage space and computation resource to maintain and compute the users' data.
Third party auditor (TPA): an entity, which has expertise and capabilities that users do not have, is trusted to assess and expose risk of cloud storage service on behalf of the users upon request. In the cloud paradigm, by putting the large data files on the remote servers, users can be relieved of the burden of storage and computation. Firstly, users compute the signature of their data, and send the data and signature to CSP. In cloud storage system, users store their data into a set of cloud servers through CSP, which run in a cooperated and distributed manner. Then, users no longer possess their data locally. If users want to check whether the data exists indeed in the cloud servers, auditing work starts, as shown in Figure 1 .
• Setup. The user negotiates the cryptographic keys with CSP and TPA.
• Challenge. After receiving the auditing request from users, TPA generates and sends a challenge to CSP.
• Proof. On receiving the challenge from TPA, CSP generates a proof of data storage and sends it to TPA. • Verification. Using some public parameters, TPA verifies the correctness of the proof from CSP, and returns TRUE/FALSE.
B. Attack Model
In cloud storage system, TPA is considered to be honest and curious. It performs honestly during the whole auditing procedure, but it is curious about the received data. CSP is considered to be dishonest. Some attacks against this system exist.
• Curiosity attack. TPA tries to read user's data by analyzing the public parameters and the proof from CSP.
• Loss attack. After losing the user's data, CSP tries to keep the truth from auditing from TPA.
• Tamper attack. CSP may tamper the user's data to other legal or illegal data, and try to keep the truth from auditing from TPA.
C. Verification Model
In the public auditing system, with the curiosity attack, loss attack and tamper attack from the adversary, the verification model consists of four algorithms .
• . The user can run this key generation algorithm to generate the secret parameters and public parameters.
• . Using the data and the secret parameters, the user can run this signature generation algorithm to generate the signature of the data.
• . Using the data and signatures stored in cloud servers, and the challenge from TPA, CSP can run this proof generation algorithm to generate the proof.
• . On receiving the proof from CSP, with public parameters, TPA can run this proof verification algorithm to check whether the data exists indeed in the cloud servers.
D. Design Goals
With the system model, attack model and the verification model, the design goals of the public auditing protocol can be summarized as the following:
• Public verifiability: to allow anyone, not just the users who originally stored the file on cloud servers, to have the capability to verify the integrity of the stored data on demand.
• Data dynamics: to allow the users to perform blocklevel operations on the data files while maintaining the same level of data integrity verification.
• Privacy preserving: no blocks cloud be retrieved by the verifier TPA during verification process.
• Secure and efficient. The design should be as secure and efficient as possible so as to ensure the public auditing process running.
IV. THE PUBLIC AUDITING PROTOCOL
A. Wang et al.'s Protocol
As described in the verification model, the public auditing protocol proposed by Wang et al. [13] is a collection of four polynomial time algorithms , which are described as follows: 
If CSP verifies (5) equal, the cloud servers possess the outsourced data. Wang et al. [13] argued that this protocol can resist against various known attacks. However, this public auditing protocol is vulnerable to the attacks from a malicious CSP or an outside adversary. In fact, SigGen algorithm is insecure. In this protocol, the signature 
B. The Proposed Protocol
To solve the security problem of the protocol in [13] , the BLS short signature scheme proposed in [17] is used directly. Homomorphic hash function presented in [19] is utilized to achieve the support for public auditing. Based on the system model and the verification model, a new and secure public auditing protocol is described as following:
• Setup. Cloud storage service runs in a cooperated and distributed manner. To store user's data file F in a set of cloud servers, F needs to be divided into n blocks 1 , , n m m  , ( , ) SigGen F sk . Given a data file 
If the above equation holds, TPA returns TRUE, and CSP indeed processes the data file { }
The homomorphism of signature generated by (6) Based on the homomorphism of the signature, the correctness of the verification equation (7) is elaborated as follows: 
V. DYNAMIC UPDATE
The user may need to conduct various operations on blocks (e.g. insertion, modification, deletion). The mechanisms to handle these changes are as the following. Note that in the following descriptions, we assume that the data file • Block Insertion.
Block insertion, a general form of data operation, refers to inserting new blocks on some specified position in the data file F . As described in Figure 2 • Block Modification. Compared to block insertion, block modification does not change the logic structure of the data file F . It refers to the replacement of specified blocks with new ones. As described in Figure 3 • Block Deletion.
Block deletion is the opposite operation of data insertion. It refers to deleting the specified block and moving all the latter blocks one block forward. As described in Figure 4 Of course, the signature technology should be used for all kinds of operation requests, so that the operations run by CSP under these requests cannot be denied by the user.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Under the attacks described in section III, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed.
• If the Pr { , , } oof σ ζ ψ = from CSP can pass the verification of (7), CSP must indeed possess the file as it is. Suppose there are loss attacks in the cloud storage system. CSP losses the user's data j m , and tries to keep the truth from auditing from TPA. So, CSP outputs 
Comparing (10) and (11), we have: 
Comparing (13) and (14), we have: 
VII. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Define the computation cost of multiplication operation on 1  to be Mul . Let Exp be the computation cost of exponent operation on 1  . Let Pairs be the computation cost of the bilinear pair. Define the computation cost of hash function to be H .
The length of signature in SigGen algorithm and proof in Pr oofGen algorithm may influence the communication of the cloud storage system. The computation cost of Pr oofGen algorithm and Pr oofVer algorithm may influence the efficiency of the cloud storage system. In these aspects, performance comparisons between the protocol in [13] and the proposed protocol are described in Table II . The protocol in [13] The proposed protocol 
